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The year that Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in Vienna, 1889,  nearby developments 
already underway portended two major changes of the coming century:  the advent of 
controlled heavier-than-air flight and the mass production of musical sound recordings.  
Before they brought about major social changes, though, these innovations appeared in 
Europe in the form of children’s toys.  Both a rubber-band-powered model helicopter-like 
toy employing an ingenious solution to the problem of control, and a working toy 
gramophone with which music could be reproduced from hard discs,  appeared in Europe 
in time for Ludwig’s childhood.  And, both innovations reappear in his work as an adult.   The 
relationship between the advent of heavier-than-air flight and Wittgenstein’s claim in 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that a proposition is a picture or model is a topic in its own 
right, and I discuss it in separate works. 1  In this essay, I consider the way Wittgenstein 
employed the development of sound recordings in discussing logical form in the Tractatus. 2  
The advent of the mass production of musical sound recordings was reflected in an event 
that took place the year Ludwig Wittgenstein was born, in the very city in which he was 
born.   On  December 17th, 1889,  Brahms recorded himself playing the piano.  The 
recording was made on a wax cylinder in the apartment of his friend Dr. Fellinger in Vienna.  
Though extremely fragile, the recording has been preserved -- it was transferred from a 
wax cylinder  to a gramophone disc in 1935 and is now available as an MP3 file on the 
internet. 3  That such care has been taken to preserve it reflects that even then, as now,  it 
was regarded as something precious.   
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The immediate family into which Ludwig Wittgenstein was born probably gave him an 
especially privileged vantage point from which to view these developments, for his father 
was Karl Wittgenstein, the immensely wealthy industrial magnate of the European steel and 
rail industry.  Technological innovations would have been of interest in such a household.  
But so, too, were literature, art and music --- especially music.  Leopoldine Wittgenstein, 
Ludwig’s mother, was a pianist, and the Wittgenstein home in Vienna contained several 
grand pianos.  One of Wittgenstein’s biographers wrote of  Leopoldine, or Poldi,  that  
“Music was her chief means of real contact with her husband and children --- music and 
perhaps the stories that she told to children so beautifully”  and that she “could play from 
sight the most elaborate pieces of music.” 4   At the time Ludwig Wittgenstein was born, 
listening to music meant hearing live performances, often at private gatherings, and the 
extravagant Wittgenstein home at 16 Allegasse in Vienna was the venue of many such 
“musical evenings”.   Johannes Brahms was a frequent guest in the household, as were 
Clara Schumann, Richard Strauss, Gustav Mahler, and many other composers.5    
The possibility of having some sort of physical record of a live musical performance other 
than a musical score 6  generated much interest in its own right, but the innovation of 
gramophone discs also introduced a possibility of great significance:  a practical means of 
hearing music other than being present at a live performance.  Up until then, the only way to 
distribute a musical composition other than by producing a  live performance was by sheet 
music (i.e., the musical score), and the publication of sheet music was in fact a lively 
business.  One visitor to the Wittgenstein household reported that  “From time to time 
superb autograph manuscripts of the Viennese musical classics were to be seen lying 
around open as one wandered about . . .” 7   Publications of sheet music of new 
compositions were greeted with great enthusiasm and interest, somewhat as new releases 
of musical compact discs are today.   
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That a sound recording that could be played back at least once was possible in principle 
had been proved well before 1889, but in practice the recordings were fragile -- both the 
number of recordings of a single performance that could be produced, and the number of 
times each recording of it could be played back were, until just before Ludwig’s birth, very 
limited.  In addition, the quality of the recording was less than exact reproduction;  in the early 
technologies, the reproduced  sound was distorted and allowed only recognition of what 
was being said, not of who was speaking.  
It was Emile Berliner’s technology of hard gramophone discs that eventually beat out 
Thomas Edison’s use of cylinder recordings in his phonograph, and in fact gramophones 
eventually came to be called phonographs in the United States.  Berliner developed a 
method whereby the quality of the reproduced sound was so good that he described it as 
an “exact reproduction”, and with which an unlimited number of discs of a single performance 
could be produced.  Berliner was a German who had emigrated to the U.S. in 1870 at the 
age of nineteen.  In 1888, ten days after he had invented the improved gramophone (but 
had not yet settled on rubber discs), he demonstrated it at a meeting of the Franklin Institute 
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and remarked on the excitement of hearing recordings of 
voices of people from whom we are separated by time or distance.  He closed his 
presentation of the improved gramophone with speculations about its practical applications:   
“. . . whole evenings will be spent at home going through a long list of interesting 
performances.  Who will deny the beneficial influence which civilization will experience when 
the voices of dear relatives and friends long ago departed, the utterances of the great men 
and women who lived centuries before, the radiant songs of Patti, Campanini, Nieman and 
others . . . can be heard and re-heard in every well-furnished parlor?”  8     Although he lived 
in, loved, and developed his invention in America, in 1889 he travelled back to Germany to 
present his improved gramophone to the Electro-Technical Society of Berlin, at their 
invitation.  While in Germany, he also arranged to have some single-sided gramophone 
discs produced there in late 1889, but sound quality was still an issue.  A German toy 
manufacturer showed interest in the device, however, and the next year, in July 1890, the 
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firm began to market a toy gramophone cranked by hand that was capable of reproducing 
music from hard 12.5 centimeter discs.  In addition, the firm produced a ” talking” doll that 
used a smaller, 8 centimeter disc.  For a short period, these were also imported to England.   
Berliner returned to the United States the next year to further develop his invention and set 
up companies to produce it.   
Thus, in 1889, the year Ludwig Wittgenstein was born, the first mass produced 
gramophone discs in the world were produced in Germany, and the next year, a working 
hand-cranked toy gramophone was  sold in Germany.   The advent of accurate, durable, 
mass produced sound recordings of musical performances should have been especially 
striking in the Wittgenstein home, since listening to musical performances played such a 
prominent role there.   It is reported that, as an adult, Wittgenstein “when listening to music 
on the gramophone put the needle back repeatedly to some musical transition from which 
he wanted to extract everything.” 9    How far back this practice harked I cannot say, but it is 
true that it would have been during his early childhood that the gramophone first became 
available, and it is hard to imagine that the advent of the gramophone, which enabled 
anyone to conjure up great musical performances this way would not have been of great 
interest.  McGuinness writes of the attitude towards music in the household in which Ludwig 
grew up:  “All the emphasis was on the expression of the musical idea and it was this that 
was discussed with a minimum of technical terms and in the vocabulary of cultivated and 
perceptive participants in the long Allegassse analyses that followed each Vienna 
Philharmonic Concert.” 10  
The invention was conceptually interesting as well as having a major practical impact, for, 
now, there was a way to represent a particular musical performance:  by the little grooves in 
a rubber disc, from which sound could be reproduced by the motion of a needle.  That 
there exist alternative durable representations of a musical composition -- i.e., that a written 
score consisting of marks on paper and an analogue gramophone record consisting of 
grooves in a rubber gramophone disc may be of the same musical piece  --- reappeared 
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three decades later,  after the infant Wittgenstein present at the birth of the use of 
gramophone discs in Europe had grown into a young man concerned with solving 
problems in logic regarding the question of how a picture or model can depict something 
else.  In particular, in considering the relationship between “the proposition -- one set out on 
the printed page, for example  --”  and “ the reality with which it is concerned”, he remarks 
that, although the proposition does not at first appear to be a picture of that reality, “neither 
do written notes seem at first sight to be a picture of a piece of music” 11   Then, he reflected 
upon the relationship between four different things:  a musical idea, the musical score, the 
sound waves made during a symphony performance, and a gramophone record of the 
symphony performance.   
But gramophone record technology was not the first well-known example of sound 
phenomena being recorded graphically:  Ernst Mach’s “schlieren” photographs of shock 
waves, by which invisible shock waves were ‘made visible’, were presented in a lecture at 
the University of Vienna in 188712 ,  had been featured in popular magazines and other 
media, and astounded general audiences as well as physicists.  Besides being visually 
striking, the photographs were valuable in laboratory investigations.  Regions of these 
photographs were darker or lighter, corresponding to geometrically similar regions of denser 
or lighter regions of air, so these photographs were what we would quite naturally regard as 
pictorial representations in the usual sense of ‘pictorial’.  Because they were made in the 
course of first explaining what happens during supersonic flight, they would certainly have 
been known to someone studying aerodynamics.   These “schlieren” photographs helped 
people visualize what was going on in the air when a bullet shot through it going faster than 
the speed of sound (more precisely, what was happening in a gaseous medium such as air 
when a bullet or other projectile shot through it faster than the speed that sound and 
mechanical waves propagate in the medium), and produced the aural phenomenon of a 
sonic boom.  In addition to the geometrical similarity between the photograph and the 
patterns of air density, there is another kind of connection between the photograph and 
what it depicts:   a causal connection.  The photographs were quite directly caused by the 
Sterrett/ “Pictures of Sounds” (forthcoming , Studies in History and Philosophy of Science)
5
phenomena they depict;  Mach used an ingenious method of flash lighting to produce 
shadows of density patterns in the air.  
Yet,  Wittgenstein does not pick up on the familiarity of these well-known, beautiful, precise, 
striking photographs of otherwise invisible phenomena and use them to illustrate his points 
about the logic of depiction.  Rather, he focuses on pairs of  seemingly dissimilar 
representations:  “At first glance the proposition -- one set out on the printed page, for 
example  -- does not seem to be a picture of the reality with which it is concerned.  But 
neither do written notes seem at first sight to be a picture of a piece of music, nor our 
phonetic notation (the alphabet) to be a picture of our speech.” 13   Once we understand 
what logical form and internal similarity amount to for Wittgenstein, though, we see that it is in 
fact with good reason that he does not use examples in which similarity is based on visual 
or geometrical similarity.   
Putting his view in aphoristic style, he writes : “A gramophone record, the musical idea, the 
written notes, and the sound-waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of 
depicting that holds between language and the world.” TLP 4.014  (Or, in the Ogden 
translation:  “. . . all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds 
between language and the world.” TLP 4.014).  What do these different things have in 
common, if anything?   His answer:  “ Ihnen allen ist der logische Bau gemeinsam.” , i.e.,  : 
“To all of them the logical structure is common.” (Ogden translation)
But what logical structure amounts to is somewhat unexpected; he does not appeal directly 
to the features of any of these representations;  the internal similarity is not established by 
referring to how the representations were actually constructed14 , how they can be 
decomposed,  to the things of which they are composed, or to any specific structural or 
formal features.  Rather, he appeals to the existence of rules by which one of them can be 
obtained from another:  
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There is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the symphony 
from the score, and which makes it possible to derive the symphony from the 
groove on the gramophone record, and using the first rule, to derive the score again.  
That is what constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to be 
constructed in such entirely different ways.  (TLP 4.0141)
There is yet another kind of representation very closely related to the representation by 
grooves on a gramophone record that Wittgenstein could have used, but did not, and the 
difference between it and the kind he did use is telling.  The kind of representation he did not 
use that I am referring to is  a kind of sound recording associated with the invention of the 
gramophone that was actually the springing-off point for the development of the 
gramophone record.  These sound recordings were made by a device for creating visible 
traces of sound patented in 1857 by Leon Scott and dubbed a phonautograph.   Emile 
Berliner begins  accounts of his own invention, the gramophone, by describing it.  
Phonautographs, or phonautograph records (produced by a machine also called a 
phonautograph) seem to have been well-known at the time, for Berliner speaks of  “Scott’s 
phonautograph” as if assuming audience familiarity with it, and another paper on the 
principles of the gramophone by a Professor Houston refers to it as “the well-known 
phonautograph of Leon Scott.” 15 
Scott’s story was poignant:  his family’s financial situation precluded them providing him an 
advanced education, and he was apprenticed to a printer as a boy.  However, his work 
involved overseeing the printing of transactions of scientific societies, which he read in the 
course of copyediting.  He came to know some of the scientists whose work he printed,  
and he corresponded with them -- about scientific topics. These pursuits led to Scott  
inventing a machine that would produce a visual record of sound; the sound records 
produced were graphical objects that could be printed.  Scott’s illustration of his invention 
shows a person performing on a musical instrument in front of the machine, and the machine, 
built roughly on the model of the human eardrum, producing a series of wavy lines 
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distinctive of the performance.   The sound record is caused by the motion of a membrane 
whose motions are in turn similar to and caused by  the sound waves produced by the 
musical instrument.  The sound records were white wavy lines scratched in a black 
background formed by a smoky film on paper, but the point was that they were distinctive 
marks corresponding to sound waves, and that, like any other two-dimensional logo, they 
could be reproduced without limit by a printing process.  The point was to have a method 
of recording sound, somewhat like present-day seismographs record waves travelling 
along the earth’s surface.  
Some put special significance on the production of wavy lines that were geometrically 
similar to the sound waves that produced them.   Berliner occasionally does seem to retain 
some of this interest in the visual aspect of a recording, as when he remarked of a hard zinc 
disc made during the process that it “becomes a picture of sound waves which, though 
slumbering in a bed of hard metal, is ready at any time, even centuries hence, to burst forth 
into the soft cadenzas of word and song, the ripple of laughter, the strains of martial music, 
as well as the melancholy and imploring drag of the organ-grinder’s tuneful melody.”16   
However, geometrical similarity to the actual sound waves was really not essential to the 
goal of producing some sort of graphical or iconic representation of sound, so I think his 
reference to the visual aspects of the gramophone lines just reflects the general awareness 
of the visually distinctive lines that were produced by the processes used in making 
gramophone records.  In March of 1857, Scott had been granted a patent for  “a method of 
drawing or writing by sound, and for multiplying the result of this graphically with a view to 
industrial applications.” 17   The same kind of device was also called a logograph.  Scott did 
not attempt to use the graphical representations to actually produce sound, but both Edison 
and Berliner later saw the potential of such a complementary process, which led to the 
development of Edison’s phonograph and Berliner’s (superior) gramophone.  
Thus, for awhile, there were phonautographs, or visual records, of sound, that were valued 
and produced only as graphical representations, and these would have been well known 
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before and during Ludwig’s childhood.  Emile Berliner remarks that Scott’s phonautograph 
“is described in every book on physical science.”18  Berliner talks about using printed 
phonautographs as a means of conveying the gramophone sound recording easily via 
printed means, the recipient with the right kind of engraving equipment then being able to 
use the printed graphical wavy lines to produce an engraved disc which could then be 
played back on a gramophone player.  The ability to produce sound from phonautographs, 
while still regarding them as visual representations,  is illustrated in a particularly colorful way 
in Berliner’s fanciful speculation that “We may then have dinner-sets, the dessert-plates of 
which have gramophone records pressed in them, and which furnish the after-dinner 
entertainment when the repast is over.” which is immediately followed by the speculation 
that  “Gramophone plaques with the voices of eminent people will adorn our parlors and 
libraries.”   Likewise, the dual aspect of a gramophone disc -- as being a representation like 
the written word in some ways and yet as able to be employed in mechanically 
reproducing the sound represented by it --- is evoked by Berliner’s statement that “I am 
carrying on a vocal correspondence with my friends in Europe, by means of small 
gramophone discs, which can be mailed in a good-sized letter envelope. . . . I could cite a 
number of instances where persons have been made happy by hearing and recognizing 
the voices of loved ones whom they had not seen in years, and the owners of which were 
thousands of miles away.” 19  
It is notable that,  in his discussion in the Tractatus about the gramophone record,  
Wittgenstein does not include the kind of graphical record that a phonautograph is among 
the group of things that have the same logical structure as the musical score -- even though 
Scott was aiming especially at the goal of providing a graphical representation of sounds.  
That is, Wittgenstein does not mention these records as graphical objects;  he mentions 
them only insofar as there is a process for generating sounds from them.  It does not 
appear that these visual records were on a par with musical notation as far as musicians 
being able to “read” them.   It makes sense, then,  that Wittgenstein does not include 
Scott’s phonautograph, given his explanation there of what logical structure consists in, since 
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there was no way to produce the musical score from a phonautograph unless there were 
some kind of playback mechanism.  Of course by the time gramophones were in 
existence, he would have been aware that it was always theoretically possible to develop 
a machine to play back a phonautograph record, but  the existence of a playback 
mechanism would essentially make the phonautograph record a gramophone record --- 
which is what he does use to illustrate his points about logical structure and pictorial 
representation   It is striking that the crucial aspect that Wittgenstein cites as accounting for 
internal similarity (and, hence, for common logical structure) in the philosophical treatise he 
writes as a young man is precisely the advance in sound recordings that was exhibited by 
the toy gramophone that premiered in nearby Germany just after his birth: “there is a rule 
by which one could reconstruct the symphony from the line on a gramophone record”  (TLP 
4.0141)  
The key notion is translation, not interpretation (in the sense that interpretation is used in 
formal logic or formalist approaches in mathematics).  Translation is a mapping from a 
meaningful entity in one language to a meaningful entity in another language, whereas 
interpretation of an entity in a formal language is a matter of producing a meaningful entity in 
some language from an entity that needs completion or supplementation in order to have a 
meaning.  In this Wittgenstein was following Frege, for Frege was against formalist 
approaches to mathematics and did not approve of what would now be called 
uninterpreted languages.  Frege’s own recasting of Hilbert’s famous independence proofs 
were carried out in terms of mapping fully interpreted sentences to fully interpreted 
sentences. 20   Wittgenstein’s statement about rules occurs in the section discussing internal 
similarity quoted earlier (TLP 4.0141). 
Revisiting that passage, we see that it is the musician’s competence in translating a musical 
score into a symphony, and the fact that there is a process by which the symphony can be 
produced from a gramophone record, that makes it possible to translate from the language 
of the musical score into the language of the gramophone record.  These rules are what 
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provides a link between the two things that at first do not seem similar:  a musical score 
(written notes) and grooves or lines on a gramophone record.  In a passage just previous 
to his remark that at first a proposition as set out on the page does not seem to be a 
picture, Wittgenstein employed the notion of a model as well as the notion of a picture, 
saying both that a proposition was a picture of reality, and that a proposition was a model of 
reality.21   In this passage about the internal similarity of the lines on the gramophone record 
and the musical score, the role of each of these things as models is crucial, but the important 
upshot is the intertranslatability that can be obtained due to their being models of a 
symphony.  
There is an asymmetry involved in the intermediate processes appealed to here to 
establish intertranslatability that Wittgenstein does not discuss:  whereas it is relatively 
straightforward to record a symphony performance as a musical score, there is a lot of room 
for artistic “interpretation” in performing a symphony from a musical score.  So when he says 
that the musician is able to read the symphony out of the score, does he mean that the 
musician is able to read out of the score the criteria that a symphony must meet in order to 
count as a symphony of which that is the score?  Or, does he mean simply that the musician 
is able to read out of the score some particular performance or performances that would 
count as a symphony to which that score corresponds?   The same issue of asymmetry 
between depiction and depicted arose with recorded voices:  in early technologies, the 
frequencies of the speaker’s performance were correctly recorded and re-enacted in the 
sounds played back, but the overtones that reflected the unique peculiarities of the speaker 
and the performance,  and allowed a hearer to recognize the speaker, were not.  Thus, 
some of the early technologies were suitable for use in dictation machines, but not for any 
use where the speaker’s voice needed to be recognizable.  If Wittgenstein’s argument 
required that a  particular symphony performance be read off the score,  there would be 
more involved in that process than simply inverting the rule of writing out a musical score 
from a symphony performance.  Yet it seems he does not think it relevant, for he speaks of 
“a general rule by which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score” and then of 
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using that same rule to construct the score from a (particular) symphony that has itself been 
reconstructed from the (particular) lines on a gramophone record.  It seems that all that 
matters to his explanation is that the musical score would, according to a musician, count as a 
musical score of the symphony, not that the symphony imagined or performed by the 
musician and the one produced mechanically by a gramophone be precisely the same in 
every detail.
It seems to me that the only way to make sense of what he says here is to regard the 
“sound-waves” of the symphony performance as specified up to a level of description  
associated with the musical notation.  If so, this is interesting in that it has the consequence 
that there are some aspects of the symphony performance (and so of the gramophone 
lines)  that are not captured in the language of the musical score.  It is certainly not true that 
the lines of the gramophone do not capture further detail about the performance that the 
written notation misses, for one striking thing about the gramophone was that not only could 
the hearer recognize what was said, but the hearer could recognize the speaker’s voice, 
and, analogously, the timbre of an instrument (overtones that differ from instrument to 
instrument, but are not indicated by the written notes).  This further detail would be exhibited 
in visual features of the lines on the gramophone disc.  Yet, according to what Wittgenstein 
says in the Tractatus,  such detail would not necessarily count as part of the logical structure 
of the gramophone lines.   
To make sense of what Wittgenstein says, then, on his view,  the features of the 
symphony from the standpoint of logical structure must be only those features of the 
symphony that are used in applying the rule by which the score is obtained from the 
symphony.  This is in fact consistent with his remark that “that rule [the rule by which the 
musician is able to obtain the symphony from the score] is the law of projection which 
projects the symphony into the language of the musical notation.”  (TLP 4.0141)  Thus the 
similarity of which he speaks is based upon just those features of the symphony that can 
be projected into that language.  Thus only what is relevant to the mode of depiction 
Sterrett/ “Pictures of Sounds” (forthcoming , Studies in History and Philosophy of Science)
12
belongs to the logical structure shared by the depiction and the depicted.  This would mean 
that the peculiarities of an individual performance, unless they are captured in both the 
musical score and the gramophone lines, are not considered part of the logical structure of 
the symphony performance.  The only logical structure discussed here is the logical structure 
that the depicted and the depiction have in common.  On this account, then, whatever 
musical notation is in use --- and it would have to be one that permits a musician to “read” 
the symphony out of a musical score --- dictates what is and is not included in the logical 
structure of the symphony. 
What should we make of this consequence of Wittgenstein’s view:   that logical structure of 
the depicted (the symphony) is not something independent of language and absolute, but 
is relative to the method of depiction (the musical notation used in musical scores) used to 
depict it ?  Is such a relativism palatable?  Perhaps neither the central place held by 
language (he refers to the language of musical notation and the language of the 
gramophone), nor the intimation that language is limited in some ways,  should surprise us.  
And such a relativism is not as unsettling as it might seem at first, if we recall that , even in 
formal logic, often a sentence or argument in natural language can be formalized in more than 
one way in the formal language (though the propositions that are formalized in this way 
need not be identical), and that the formal language used may determine how the sentence 
or argument can be formalized.  Wittgenstein remarks that from colloquial language “it is not 
humanly possible to gather immediately from [everyday language] what the logic of 
language is.”  (TLP 4.002 )  
It is one step further, of course, to talk about capturing the “true” logical form of a sentence or 
argument, and one could argue that it is not the task of a logic of depiction that it arbitrate 
between possible alternate depictions of reality.  I think that what this consequence does 
show is that logical structure, on his view,  is rooted in the possibility of translating between 
two languages -- two languages that may be entirely different, even use different kinds of 
representations (notes on a musical score versus wavy lines on a gramophone disc), and 
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may even have different expressive capabilities (the gramophone disc can capture more 
details about a particular symphony performance than the musical notation does).   
Appreciating this last point about translation helps us make sense of an otherwise puzzling 
statement Wittgenstein makes that even our phonetic alphabet has not lost its pictorial 
character.  This seems on the face of it an ignorant thing to say, especially when taking into 
consideration that it was written in the context of the much-emphasized contrast drawn at the 
time between iconic symbols (such as hieroglyphs) and non-iconic symbols (such as letters 
of a phonetic alphabet).  Although it may be slightly disingenuous to put the point as he 
does in saying that the phonetic alphabet has not lost its pictorial character, what 
Wittgenstein says about pictorial form does in fact support that statement.   For, on his 
account, a claim that translation is possible can be based on the existence of a skill or 
competence:  although Wittgenstein speaks of  “a rule” out of which such translatability 
ensues, that rule is really a matter of the ability of a trained musician to ‘read the symphony 
out of the score.’   Anyone who has learned to read will have the analogous skill for the 
phonetic alphabet, and thus, on his account, the phonetic alphabet and a hieroglyphic script 
could be said to share the same logical structure.  Hence, as he says,  ‘alphabetic script 
developed out of [hieroglyphic script] without losing what was essential to depiction.’  (TLP 
4.016)
The emphasis on human competencies is actually indicated at the beginning of that section 
of the Tractatus; near the beginning of  the set of statements whose number begins with “4” 
he remarks that :  “The tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language 
depends are enormously complicated.”  (TLP 4.022)  The skill aspect is rather deep-
seated, extending to the very capability for language itself:  ‘Man possesses the capacity 
of constructing languages, in which every sense can be expressed, without having an idea 
how and what each word means --- just as one speaks without knowing how the single 
sounds are produced.’  (TLP 4.002) 
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For some people, the advent of the gramophone invited reflection upon the contrast 
between the analogue representation provided by a gramophone record and the discrete 
symbol notation of a musical score:  a contrast, as some put it, between image and symbol.  
But, Wittgenstein instead took advantage of the occasion of the advent of the gramophone 
to reflect on the common logical form of these two kinds of representations:  i.e., the lines in 
the gramophone record and the written notes in the  musical score.  The key notion turns out 
to be the ability to translate between the two, and this is done via intermediate steps 
involving a symphony ---  though it is important to understand that the symphony 
generated by the gramophone player need not be identical in every detail to the 
symphony that the musician would produce from the musical score.  
The musician’s ability to ‘read the symphony in the score’ is a complex human skill,  but 
Wittgenstein regarded the ability to understand everyday language a complex skill, too, as 
indicated in the passage in the Tractatus:  “The tacit conventions on which the understanding 
of everyday language depends are enormously complicated”  (TLP 4.002)  So another 
point that Wittgenstein’s analogy between musical notation, the phonetic alphabet, and 
hieroglyphics evokes is his earlier statement that, like visual images and musical ideas, 
“Everyday language is part of the human organism.”  (TLP 4.022)
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